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Abstract 
 
This study explores the determinants of investment using both aggregated industry-level 
data and disaggretated data on 27 sub-sectors of the manufacturing sector for the period 
1970-2001.  According to the results in this study, the government has potentially 
powerful means at its disposal to stimulate private investment.  In particular, a domestic 
demand stimulus and public investment expansion will produce large gains in private 
investment.  While the direct effects of lowering the interest rate appear to be 
quantitatively small, indirect effects operating notably through domestic demand and 
cheaper credit are likely to be large.  The evidence in this study also indicates that it is 
important to minimize exchange rate instability to encourage investment. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The South African economy has achieved substantial success in the area of 
macroeconomic stabilization in the post post-apartheid era.1  However, stabilization has 
not yielded the growth rates that are needed to lift up the living standards of the majority 
of the population.  Most importantly, despite remarkable success in the areas of 
macroeconomic stabilization, the country still faces difficult challenges arising from the 
legacy of marginalization of the majority of the population from the main stream 
economy.2  Increasing the living standards of the majority of the population will require 
faster overall growth, vigorous employment creation, and stronger and sustained private 
investment response to policy reform. 
 
Since the second half of the 1970s, performance in private and public investment has 
been disappointing.  From 1993 to 2002, total investment as a ratio of GDP increased 
only by 1.3% on average in real terms.  This study explores the determinants of 
investment with the explicit goal of guiding a discussion of how macroeconomic policies 
can be used to induce an “investment transition” in South Africa.3  There are important 
empirical and policy reasons for why investment should be at the center of the debate on 
how to promote growth and raise employment.  The empirical literature has identified 
                                                 
1 A recent IMF Staff Report (IMF 2003) commended the South African authorities for maintaining “strict 
fiscal discipline”, managing the currency, and controlling inflation.  For a quantitative analysis of 
macroeconomic stabilization in South Africa, see Du Plessis (2002, 2004); Du Plessis and Smit (2003). 
2 See Gelb (2004) for a review of recent macroeconomic developments. 
3  By “investment transition”, we understand sustained substantial increase in the investment/GDP ratio 
over several consecutive years.  In a cross-country analysis, Rodrik (1999) finds that countries that 
experience an investment transition go from a GDP growth rate of 0.8% above world average to 1.4% 
above world average (amounting to 2.2% gain in growth).  Sub-Saharan African countries in general have 
had difficulty sustaining investment growth. 
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investment as the most robust determinant of economic growth (Levine and Renelt 1992), 
especially equipment investment (De Long and Summers 1991).  Both private investment 
and public investment are key determinant of cross-country differences in long-run 
economic growth (Easterly and Rebelo 1993).  This empirical relationship between 
investment and growth has led observers to identify low investment as one of the leading 
causes of the slow growth in developing countries in general and in African countries in 
particular (Collier and Gunning 1999; Greene and Villanueva 1991). 
 
In addition to its documented contribution to growth, private investment in the case of 
South Africa deserves serious attention for three additional reasons.  First, sustained 
increase in private investment will serve as visible proof of the private sector’s 
confidence in public policy both in the sense that policy is heading in the right direction 
and that policy reforms are deemed sustainable in the long run.  Achieving the growth 
rates needed to alleviate poverty and raise employment will require active participation of 
private investors.  Second, sustained increase in private investment is a sign of efficiency 
of public investment especially in reducing the costs of private investment, thus raising 
profitability.4  Third, sustained improvement in private investment serves as a catalyst for 
attracting foreign direct investment as it is an indicator of high returns to investment and 
declining investment risk in the country.   
 
The study explores the determinants of private investment with a special emphasis on the 
role of factors that are related to macroeconomic policy.  An econometric analysis is 
                                                 
4 See Rienikka and Svensson (2002) for firm-level evidence on the important role of public services for 
private investment.  The authors find that while firms may attempt to find alternative private sources of 
normally publicly supplied services, they do so at the cost of reduced capital accumulation. 
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undertaken to attempt to quantify the effects of individual macroeconomic policy 
indicators on investment to identify channels of transmission of macroeconomic policy.  
The analysis provides quantitative evidence that may shed light on strategies for boosting 
private investment as the country seeks ways to raise the trend of GDP growth and 
accelerate employment creation. 
 
II. Trends and patterns of aggregate and sector-level investment 
 
Investment in South Africa has exhibited two features: a long-run decline since the mid-
1970s and high short–run volatility (Figure 1).  The country has been unable to sustain 
increases in investment, as expansions of investment are followed by contractions.  Up to 
the mid-1970s, the country maintained a steady upward trend in domestic investment, 
peaking at 29.7 percent in 1976.  Since then, investment has exhibited a steady decline.  
From an average of 26.4 percent of GDP in the 1970s, the investment/GDP ratio declined 
to 23 percent in the 1980s and has averaged only 15.6 percent of GDP during the past 10 
years of the post-apartheid era.   
 
The rate of capital accumulation has declined in all sectors since the 1970s, although the 
decline has been more dramatic in some sectors than in others.  In the service sector, the 
rate of capital accumulation has declined from about 10 percent in 1970 to less than 1 
percent in 2002.  While investment in the manufacturing sector showed some 
improvement since the mid-1990s, the recovery was unbalanced.  It was mainly driven by 
a few subsectors, iron and steel, non-ferrous metal, and basic chemicals (Roberts 2004).  
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Agriculture has experienced consecutive years of decline in capital accumulation since 
the early 1980s and shows no signs of recovery. 
 
The data indicate that while private investment has exhibited a slow but steady recovery 
since the mid-1980s, public investment has declined systematically from since 1976 from 
11.5 percent of GDP to a low of 4 percent in 1994 and stood at 5 percent in 2004 (Figure 
2).  Public investment in South Africa was above the Sub-Saharan average until 1986 but 
since then it has declined and dropped below the average for SSA and middle-income 
countries (Figure 3).5  Increasing the country’s public investment from its current level of 
5 percent of GDP level to at least the modest African average of 7 percent would result in 
substantial gains in infrastructure. 
 
The trend of public investment in South Africa casts doubts on some claims in the 
empirical literature about the level of public investment and its effects on private 
investment.  First, the claim that public investment may be “too high” in Africa (Easterly 
and Pack 2001) certainly does not apply to South Africa.  The decline in GDP growth 
experienced since the 1980s cannot be blamed on high public investment since the latter 
declined as growth was deteriorating.  In contrast, one may argue that the decline in 
public investment is partly responsible for poor growth performance.  Second, the claim 
that allocation of national resources was biased in favor of public investment relative to 
private investment is not supported by the data.  Mlambo and Nell (2000: 96) argue that 
low real interest rates in the 1970s and 1980s redirected capital to the less productive 
                                                 
5 According to the 2004 World Bank classification, South Africa is at the cut off point between upper 
middle and lower middle income countries.  Comparisons between South Africa’s public investment with 
either of the two groups shows a similar pattern. 
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parastatals away from more productive private sector.  This argument is problematic.  
First, lower user cost of capital would redirect capital to the public sector only if there are 
quantitative restrictions to access to credit for the private sector that create a “captive 
market” for government debt.  Second a decline in the cost of capital would reduce 
private investment if the returns to capital are declining faster than the costs of capital.  
There is no evidence for such a phenomenon either in South Africa or in other African 
countries in general, where profit rates are generally high (Gunning and Mengistae 2001; 
Bigsten et al 1999).  Third, public investment started to decline in the mid-1970s when 
real interests were negative and continued to decline even when real interest rates turned 
positive and started to increase in the late 1980s.  High real interest rates did not redirect 
capital into private investment.  In contrast, the evidence seems to support the empirical 
finding that the long-run level of public investment is an important factor for private 
investment.  Blejer and Khan (1984) find that while public investment may crowd out 
private in the short run, the trend level of public investment has a positive effect on 
investment.  This suggests that the positive externalities associated with investment in 
infrastructure outweigh any short-run costs associated with the potential adverse effects 
of public expenditure on the cost of capital.  Claims of “crowding out” based on short-run 
relationships may therefore be misleading.   
 
III. Major macroeconomic policy regime shifts and their relevance for investment 
 
Monetary Policy 
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Monetary policy orientation in South Africa has experienced a series of changes since the 
1960s (for details, see Table A1).6  In the 1960s and for most of the 1970s, the Reserve 
Bank used the ratio of liquid assets to deposits as its main tool for controlling financial 
intermediation by reducing bank lending in order to control money supply and inflation.  
Performance of monetary policy was poor during this period and inflation remained high 
and volatile.  In the mid-1980s, following the recommendations by the De Kock 
Commission (1985), the Reserve Bank shifted its policy framework to a cost-of-reserves 
based system, taking effect in mid-1985.   
 
From 1986 to 1998, the Reserve Bank used monetary aggregates as intermediate targets 
with pre-announced growth rates.  By the end of the 1990s, it was evident that targeting 
monetary aggregates was an ineffective guide for monetary policy.  From 1986 to 2000, 
the Reserve Bank overshot its pre-announced growth rate of the broad money stock in 9 
years out of 15.    
 
In March 1998, the Reserve Bank announced a new system of monetary management, 
consisting of daily tenders of liquidity through repurchase transactions, with the explicit 
intention of rationing the amount of liquidity in the system.  This was the beginning of a 
movement towards a “market-oriented” monetary policy system where interest rates are 
determined by market forces.  The Reserve Bank expressed its desire to reduce inflation 
to the levels prevailing among the country’s major trading partners and announced an 
                                                 
6 A non-exhaustive list of useful references on the history and conduct of monetary policy in South Africa 
includes.  Du Plessis (2002); Du Plessis and Smit (2003); Whittaker (1992); Padayachee (2001); De Wet, 
Jonkergouw, and Koekemoer (1995). 
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informal inflation targeting framework with a range of 1-5% for the overall CPI index.  In 
February 2000, the government formally adopted inflation targeting as the principal 
objective and focus of monetary polity.7  The rationale of the shift was that inflation 
targeting is the best way to achieve price stability because it specifies a precise target 
inflation rate and indicates a clear commitment by the monetary policy authority to 
achieve the target.  According to the SARB, inflation targeting “helps to anchor the 
public’s inflation expectations, thereby improving planning for the economy, as well as 
providing an anchor for expectations of future inflation to influence price and wage 
setting.”8   
 
The Reserve Bank has pursued inflation targeting by keeping interest rates high as a way 
of controlling domestic demand.  The nominal interest rate has at times risen while 
inflation was declining (as in 1993-98), resulting in a sharp increase in real interest rate.  
Real interest rates also have increased faster in South Africa than in trading partners, 
resulting in higher interest rates differentials (Figure 4).  These developments imply that 
firms are facing higher costs of credit, which constitutes a constraint to capital 
accumulation.   
 
Monetary policy influences private investment directly by affecting the cost of credit.  
Therefore, there is an inherent tension between the objectives of achieving low inflation 
                                                 
7  In 2000, the Finance Minister signed a letter to the Reserve Bank Governor constituting an agreement 
between the Government and the Reserve Bank on inflation targeting.  The letter outlined how the Reserve 
Bank ought to handle unforeseen shocks (oil prices, drought, changes in direct taxes, international financial 
contagion) that may prevent the Bank from achieving the target, in which case the Reserve Bank will give a 
full public explanation. 
8 Tito T. Mboweni (Governor of the South African Reserve Bank). “The objectives and importance of 
inflation targeting.” Business Day, November 13, 2002. 
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and the goal of promoting domestic investment.  Monetary policy affects investment 
indirectly as well by constraining domestic credit as a means of controlling inflation.  In 
2000, South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel stated that high domestic credit 
extension is an obstacle to economic development and a constraint to monetary policy.  
He put is as follows: “Living beyond our means has become part of the national psyche.  
It is saddening.  We would like to bring down interest rates, but as long as private credit 
extension is so high, that counteracts development.”9  The problem with this orientation 
of monetary policy is that by constraining credit expansion, contractionary monetary 
policy reduces aggregate demand, which constitutes a constraint to investment and output 
expansion.  Tight monetary policy associated with high interest rates and a strong 
currency also hurt the export sector, undermining international competitiveness.  
Achieving low inflation is therefore potentially costly in terms of reduced investment, 
employment, and output.   
 
Exchange rate policy 
 
The South African exchange rate regime has undergone five major phases since the 
1960s (De Kock Commission 1985; Aron, Elbadawi, and Kahn 2000).  The first phase 
goes until 1978, where the rand was pegged alternatively to the dollar and the pound.  
This period was also characterized by strict controls of the capital account.  In 1979, 
following the recommendations by the De Kock Commission, the government adopted a 
dual exchange rate system to stabilize the capital account while attracting foreign 
                                                 
9 Saturday Star Business Report, 12 August 2000.  Cited in South Africa Survey 2000/2001 (by the South 
African Institute for Race Relations, Johannesburg), p. 442. 
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investment.  Under this system, current account and loan transactions were executed at a 
market-determined exchange rate, the commercial rand.  Equity capital, in turn, was 
transacted at a freely floating exchange rate, the financial rand.  The reform was intended 
to eliminate the disincentives associated with the pre-existing securities rand system, 
whereby inflows of investment other than purchases of listed securities were transacted at 
the official exchange rate whereas investment outflows were transacted at a lower rate.  
In 1983, the dual system was unified under a controlled float system (third phase), but the 
dual system was reintroduced in September 1985 and lasted until 1995 (fourth phase).  In 
March 1995 (fifth phase), the regime was unified again, in the context of a systematic 
move toward a market-based exchange rate system. 
 
The past shifts in exchange rate regimes proved inefficient in stabilizing the capital 
account and the value of the rand.  Under the fixed exchange rate where the Reserve 
Bank was effectively controlling the sale and purchase price of currency, the regime 
prevented the emergence of an active and competitive foreign exchange market.  At the 
same time, exchange controls proved inefficient in protecting the official exchange rate 
and in deterring capital outflows.   
 
Movements in the exchange rate of the rand have historically been driven by the policy 
stance in the area of exchange rate and capital controls and by political developments and 
external shocks (especially commodity price shocks).  The most noteworthy political 
events that had substantial effects on the exchange rate are the 1960 Sharpeville 
massacres, the 1976 Soweto riots, and the protracted political unrest beginning in the 
 9
mid-1984.  These political shocks were followed by large capital account deficits, largely 
due to capital outflows but also due to reduction in capital inflows including debt, which 
resulted in depreciation of the exchange.   
 
The effects of the exchange rate on private investment are theoretically ambiguous.  Real 
exchange rate depreciation increases profitability in export oriented sectors and therefore 
promotes investment in these sectors.  Conversely, depreciation of the exchange rate 
increases the cost of imported capital goods, and thus decreases investment in import 
dependent production sectors.  The study by Mlambo and Nell (2000) finds that the 
appreciation of the rand had a negative effect on investment.  Most importantly, the 
volatility and unpredictability of the exchange rate increase uncertainty, which 
discourages long-term investment in capital stock in favor of short-run speculative 
activities.  The empirical analysis in this study will explore the effects of exchange rate 
instability on investment. 
 
Fiscal policy 
 
The post-independence South African government has gained international reputation for 
“strict fiscal discipline,” a label that is rarely attached to a developing country (IMF 
2003).  The fiscal situation in recent years constitutes a marked departure from past 
history of high deficits and politically motivated government spending.  Until the mid-
1990s, the South African government systematically ran high deficits, mainly due to high 
(politically motivated) expenditure and weak revenue performance.  The fiscal deficit 
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exploded especially in the last years of the apartheid regime as the National Party 
prepared to exit and engineered a massive increase in public salaries as well as pension 
payouts (Gelb 2004: 4).  At the end of the apartheid regime, government expenditures 
also increased as a result of “social upliftment” initiatives (Cronje 1998).   
 
The budget deficit rose from 3 percent of GDP in 1988 to a record high of 8 percent in 
1994 (Figure 5).  Government debt increased from 33 percent to 50 percent of GDP 
during the same period.  Since 1994, the deficit has declined steadily due to both better 
revenue performance (from efficiency gains in tax collection as well as an increase in the 
tax base) and compression in expenditures.   
 
The main shift in fiscal stance occurred in 1999 as the government sought to achieve 
fiscal stability through the reduction of the deficit.  The target for the conventional fiscal 
deficit was set at 3 percent of GDP.10  The following year the government announced the 
adoption of inflation targeting as the overriding goal of monetary policy. 
 
Fiscal policy may affect private investment through five channels.  First, under the view 
that investment is dependent on saving, fiscal policy influences private investment by 
affecting the volume of savings.  Tight fiscal policy is supposed to promote private 
investment by raising total domestic saving and reducing interest rates.  Second, from an 
intertemporal view of investment behavior, fiscal policy can also promote investment by 
building investors confidence vis-à-vis predictability and credibility of fiscal policy.  For 
                                                 
10 Fiscal deficit targeting was initially adopted at the end of 1994.  It is coincidentally in 1994 that reserve 
bank independence was included in the interim Constitution. 
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this channel to operate the government must not only pursue low fiscal deficits, but also 
be consistent in pursuing clear and pre-committed goals; that is, the government must 
overcome the problem of time inconsistency of fiscal policy.  Third, under the view that 
investment is demand constrained, fiscal policy influences investment by affecting 
domestic demand.  Tight fiscal policy through expenditure compression or/and tax hikes 
reduces domestic aggregate demand, which negatively affects sales and profits 
expectations, thus reducing incentives to invest.  Fourth, fiscal policy affects investment 
directly through the cost of capital as influenced by tax policy.  Finally, fiscal policy 
affects investment through public infrastructure investment, which reduces private costs 
of production thereby raising profitability. 
 
In light of the above five potential channels of the effects of fiscal policy on investment, 
it appears that the recent orientation of fiscal policy in South Africa has pursued the first 
two channels (deficit-saving-investment linkages and intertemporal considerations).  The 
government expected that reducing the deficit and establishing a record of credibility and 
consistency in fiscal policy would boost private investment.  This has not happened as 
investment has continued to be sluggish.  This may suggest at least two interpretations.  
First, saving may indeed not be the constraint for private investment (Gelb 2004: 14).  
Second, the dividends from fiscal policy credibility and consistency may be slow to 
materialize.  This would be because the private sector is still unsure about the 
sustainability of macroeconomic policy stance in the long run.  This may be also due to 
perception gaps between what the public believes and what the government actually 
accomplishes (Gelb 2002: 32).   
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 Policy makers have overlooked the third and fourth channel of the linkages between 
fiscal policy and investment (through aggregate demand and public infrastructure 
investment).  In fact, the monetary authority has explicitly pursued policies that contain 
domestic demand as a way of controlling inflation as we discussed in the section on 
monetary policy earlier.  By containing domestic demand, the authority may have 
indirectly contributed to the slow growth of domestic investment.  The effects of low 
domestic demand on private investment may have exacerbated the effects of the decline 
in public investment observed since the 1970s. 
 
IV. New estimates of the impact of macroeconomic policy on investment 
 
Motivation of the empirical model and estimation methodology 
The empirical analysis in this study aims at exploring the effects of macroeconomic 
policy on private investment for the purpose of examining strategies that may be used to 
boost private investment.  We adopt a hybrid model that draws from the neoclassical and 
Keynesian traditions by emphasizing the role of demand (the accelerator), the cost of 
capita, and profitability.   
 
The demand-investment link and macroeconomic policy 
The accelerator theory of investment suggests that investment responds to changes in 
demand for output (Jorgenson 1971).  Macroeconomic policy can affect private 
investment by affecting domestic demand directly.  A contractionary monetary policy 
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that raises interest rates and/or constrains credit expansion will reduce aggregate demand, 
which reduces private investment.  Demand is also affected by fiscal policy directly 
through government spending and indirectly through transfer programs.  
 
This study explores demand effects by including real GDP growth in the investment 
equation.  Existing empirical studies on South Africa confirm the important role of 
demand for investment (Table 1).  Data on the manufacturing sector also provide indirect 
evidence on the role of demand.  Insufficient demand account for the bulk of the 
underutilization capacity in the sector (Table A3). 
 
One condition for validity of the accelerator is that installed capacity is fully utilized.  
When firms have idle capacity, they can meet an increase in demand by raising 
production without installing new capital.  We control for these effects by including 
capacity underutilization in addition to output growth.  However, data on capacity 
utilization by sub-sector are only available starting from 1986.  The regressions with 
capacity underutilization also serve to check the robustness of the results obtained with 
the longer sample period. 
 
Cost of capital 
 
Firms invest up to the point where marginal efficiency of capital equals the user cost of 
capital.  A rise in the user cost reduces optimal capital stock and investment.  The basic 
measure of capital stock comprises the real interest rate, the effective corporate tax rate, 
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the depreciation rate and the ratio of the price of capital goods to the price of output.11  
The measure used in this study is the following:   
 
)1/()).(/( tittttitit RpPPIuck τδπ −+−=            eq.1 
 
where PPI is the sector or industry-specific producer price index, p is the GDP deflator, R 
is the nominal interest rate, π  is the inflation rate, δ  is sector or industry-specific 
depreciation rate, and τ  is the corporate tax rate.12  
 
The user cost of capital is then decomposed into its policy components in order to 
quantify the effects of macroeconomic policy on investment through the cost of capital.  
Monetary policy affects the cost of capital through the interest rate and inflation.  The 
data show that since the mid-1990s, nominal interest rates remained high even when 
inflation started to decline, which resulted in high interest rates.  Moreover, 
misalignments of domestic interest rates relative to international rates resulted in high 
interest rate differentials, which tends to reduce incentives for investment in capital stock 
while encouraging speculative investment.  The study explores these effects by regressing 
investment on alternatively the nominal interest rate, the real interest rate and the interest 
rate differential.  The effects of fiscal policy are tested through the corporate tax rate.   
 
Public investment and government debt 
                                                 
11 A comprehensive measure of the user cost of capital takes into account returns to equity, investment tax 
credits, tax liability implications of dividend payouts, tax implications of debt financing, etc.  See 
Jorgenson and Hall (1967) for details. 
12 We do not have data on value added by sub-sector in the manufacturing sector.  Therefore, this variable 
is not included in the manufacturing sector regressions. 
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 Public investment affects private investment through two main channels.  The first 
channel works though positive externalities of public services and infrastructure that 
reduce production and transactions costs, thus raising marginal efficiency of private 
capital stock.  The second channel operates through demand.  An increase in public 
investment causes domestic demand and incomes to rise directly and through the 
multiplier effects. 
 
Empirical studies on South Africa have shown crowding-in effects of public investment 
on private investment.  Mlambo and Nell (2000) find that a 10 percent increase in 
government expenditure results in a 0.24 percent increase in private investment.  Fielding 
(1999) estimates the elasticity of private investment with respect to public investment to 
be 0.44 for traded capital and 0.36 for non-traded capital.   
 
The ability to use public investment to stimulate private investment is constrained by the 
ability of the government to finance public investment without creating excessive 
pressure on the budget.  The crowding-in effects of public investment on private 
investment may be mitigated by crowding-out effects of deficit financing.  We explore 
empirically the net impact of these crowding-out and crowding-in effects to assess the 
feasibility of a public-investment driven stimulus for private investment. 
 
Labor market factors: costs and skills 
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Whether high labor costs cause firms to substitute labor for capital ultimately depends on 
the nature of the technology used in the industry.  If capital and labor are substitutes, then 
we expect a negative correlation between labor costs and investment.  There is little 
empirical evidence on South African private sector in support for either a positive or 
negative effect of labor costs on investment. While Mlambo and Nell (200) find a 
negative effect of labor costs on investment the effect is quantitatively very small (an 
elasticity of -0.009).  Fielding (1997) in contrast finds a positive correlation between 
labor costs and investment suggesting substitution between capital and labor.   
 
Labor costs will encourage capital-labor substitution if labor costs are rising faster than 
labor productivity.  We test for this possibility by including in the empirical model a 
measure of the wage-labor productivity gap defined as the difference between the growth 
rate of real wages and the growth rate of labor productivity.  The results were 
insignificant and are not reported in the paper. 
 
One potential constraint to investment is the shortage of skilled labor.  In the context of a 
technologically advancing economy, investment expansion requires adequate skills in the 
labor market.  In South Africa, given the historical legacy of marginalization of the black 
population in education, a large fraction of the labor force comprises low-skilled workers.  
Unfortunately, it was not possible to test for these effects because do not have reliable 
data on skill composition of the labor force by sector. 
 
Data and highlights 
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 The empirical analysis is based on a panel of aggregate data on the 9 major industries as 
well as a panel data on 27 sub-sectors of the manufacturing sector over the period 1970-
2001.  The industry-level analysis allows us to make inferences on economy-wide effects 
of policy on investment.  The analysis at the disaggregated level in turn provides more 
degrees of freedom and variability in the regressors, which should improve the quality of 
the estimates.  Using both levels of aggregation allows us to generalize the results that are 
consistent in both sets of data.  Analyses using only aggregate data are often criticized for 
being too far from the level where the actual investment decision takes place.  Analyses 
at the micro-level in turn face the challenge of generalizability of the results.  We are able 
to circumvent the shortcomings of the analysis at either level while taking advantage of 
the benefits arising from each level of aggregation.  We can be confident that results 
which are robust at both levels of aggregation are indeed telling us something about the 
true response of private investment to policy innovations.   
 
Although most of the relevant series are available up to 2003, we stop the regression 
sample at 2001 because of discontinuities in the unit labor costs series after 2001 that 
make the data incomparable before and after 2001.  Another truncation of the sample 
occurs when we include a measure of capacity utilization for which the information is 
available only starting from 1986.  Therefore regressions with capacity utilization cover 
the 1986-2001 period.   
 
Specification and estimation methodology 
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 Taking into account the foregoing discussion and the objectives of the study, we 
formulate a dynamic empirical investment model that emphasizes the role of demand and 
the cost of capital, the latter being a function of policy, controlling for other determinants 
of investment.  The model is specified as follows: 
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where I is the investment-capital stock ratio; Y is the industry or sector output; uck is the 
user cost of capital, which is a function of policy variables, namely the interest rate and 
the effective corporate tax rate; iν  represents industry- or sector-level fixed effects; ε  is 
a random error term; q is the number of lags for the regressors (which may vary by 
regressor); and X is a vector of other determinants of investment.  Among other 
determinants of investment we explore fiscal policy variables (public investment and 
domestic government debt), labor market factors (the unit labor costs), indicators of 
macroeconomic instability, namely inflation and exchange rate variability,13 capacity 
underutilization, and profits.  Real profits are obtained by deducting the real wage bill 
from real value added: itittitit Lwpvaprofit */ −= , where va is real value added, w is 
                                                 
13 A proxy for the variability of the real exchange rate is calculated as the absolute value of the deviation of 
the annual value of the real exchange rate from the average of the previous three years.  A drawback of this 
proxy is that it assumes symmetry of the effects of exchange rate instability on investment (appreciation vs. 
depreciation).  Regressions with the actual deviation yield an insignificant coefficient. 
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real earnings per employee, L is employment.  The summary statistics for the regression 
variables are given in Tables A2-A3 in the appendix.14   
 
To handle country fixed effects, we can first-difference or mean-difference equation eq.1.  
First-differencing yields the following: 
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However, by construction, the first-differenced error term in eq.3 is no longer orthogonal 
to the first-differenced regressors, especially the differenced lagged dependent variable, 
thus violating an important condition for validity of the OLS estimators.  We can apply 
the standard instrumental variable approach to address this issue or apply a more general 
method where all (first-differenced) regressors are potentially endogenous.  The general 
method is implemented with the GMM procedure where second and higher lags of the 
levels of the endogenous variables and the lagged dependent variable are used as 
instruments of the differenced endogenous variables and the differenced lag of the 
dependent variable, while differenced exogenous variables serve as their own instruments 
(Arrelano and Bond 1991).  For the industry-level data, the instrumental-variable fixed-
effects regressions produced superior results to GMM regressions.  For the manufacturing 
sector data, the two-step GMM procedure was applied as the one-step results indicated 
the presence of a first-order serial correlation. 
 
Discussion of the empirical results 
                                                 
14 The means are used to compute the elasticities associated with the regression coefficients.  In the 
regressions on the manufacturing subsector with a measure of capacity underutilization, the variables are in 
logs (thus the coefficients are elasticities) except for the growth rate of output and the real interest rate, for 
which the elasticities are obtained by multiplying the coefficient and the mean of the regressor. 
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 The regression results are organized as follows: regressions on industry data are reported 
in Table 2.  Regressions on manufacturing sub-sectors are in Table 3 and the implied 
elasticities are reported in Table 4 (both at the industry level and for the manufacturing 
sector).  The regressions on the 1986-2001 period that include capacity underutilization 
are reported in Tables 5.  The discussion will emphasize results related to factors that can 
be influenced by policy. 
 
Demand and the accelerator effects 
The regression results confirm a significant and robust accelerator effect on investment at 
the aggregate/industry level as well as at the manufacturing sector level.  If we interpret 
industry-level results as economy-wide results, these results suggest that were the country 
able to raise its trend GDP growth from its current level of 3 percent to 4.5 percent, this 
would induce a one percent increase in investment.  Regressions that include real output 
rather than its growth rate show a very high demand elasticity of investment, where every 
one-rand additional domestic demand induces about 80 cents of new investment (not 
reported here but available from the author upon request). 
 
These results suggest that an important strategy for increasing investment is to raise the 
level of domestic demand and the trend growth of GDP.  The relationship between 
demand/growth and investment goes both ways.  Raising demand and growth stimulates 
investment, but also more investment itself will contribute to more growth.  A domestic 
demand stimulus is a precondition for investment response to policy reform.  Therefore, 
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policies that raise income to stimulate private consumption, such as direct government 
spending on infrastructure and social transfers will have positive effects on private 
investment through the accelerator effects.  In the end, expansionary policies will have 
beneficial effects on growth through capital accumulation. 
 
The cost of capital: interest rate and corporate tax 
Consistent with earlier studies, we find that investment is responsive to the cost of capital 
(also see Hirsh 2004).  However, the effect of the composite measure of the user cost of 
capital is insignificant at the industry level (not reported here) and, while it is significant 
at the manufacturing sector level, it is quantitatively small (with an elasticity of -0.085).  
We decompose the user cost of capital to isolate the effects of the real interest rate and 
the corporate tax rate.   
 
We find that both the real interest rate and the nominal interest rate have a negative and 
significant effect on investment both at the economy-wide level and in the manufacturing 
sector.  However, investment seems to be more responsive to changes in the nominal 
interest rate than changes in the real interest rate.  The real interest-rate elasticity of 
investment is -0.07 at the industry level compared to -0.26 for the nominal interest rate.  
The corresponding elasticities in the manufacturing sector regressions are -0.05 and  
-0.18, respectively.  Note, however, that when we control for capacity underutilization, 
which is a richer specification of the accelerator investment model, we obtain a larger 
effect of the interest rate.  The increase in the coefficient and elasticity is more noticeable 
for the real interest rate, tripling from -0.05 to -0.16 while that associated elasticity with 
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respect to the nominal interest rate rises from -0.18 to -0.31 (Tables 5).  According to the 
results in Table 5, if the real interest rate was reduced from, say 10 percent to 8 percent (a 
20 percent cut), investment would increase by about 3 percent.  
 
Although the direct positive effects of lowering the interest rates on investment may seem 
quantitatively small, there is one important advantage to exploiting this effect to stimulate 
investment.  The government has at its disposal ready policy tools for cutting the interest 
rate to encourage investment without having to wait for other changes in the economy to 
occur first.   These policy tools are monetary policy to lower the general level of market 
interest rates and credit allocation policies to provide favorable rates for sectors of the 
economy that are deemed to have strong income and employment multiplier effects.   
 
The results show that a high effective corporate tax rate can deter private investment.  
The regressions on the full sample suggest that these effects are likely to be quantitatively 
small.  Note, however, that the regressions with capacity underutilization on the shorter 
sample period yield larger effects, implying that a 10 percent increase in the corporate tax 
rate may cause as much as 2 percent contraction in investment (Tables 5).  This suggests 
that the government faces limitations in its ability to raise revenue by increasing taxes on 
businesses.  This also implies that there is a need for exploring alternative sources of tax 
revenue (other than increasing taxes) that do not have direct adverse effects on the 
profitability of capital accumulation.   
 
Public investment and profitability 
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Consistent with other studies, this paper finds that higher profitability stimulates private 
investment.  To the extent that policy can increase firm profits, this would increase 
investment.  One way for policy to promote firm profitability is through public 
infrastructure investment.  Investments in improvement of availability and quality of 
transportation services, telecommunication, electricity, etc., will reduce the costs of 
production, raise profitability, and stimulate private investment.   
 
According to the regression results, increasing South Africa’s ratio of public investment 
to GDP from its current level of 5 percent to, say 6 percent – the average level for upper-
middle income countries, would generate 5.6 percent more investment.15  
 
The results are consistent with firm-level empirical evidence on the role of infrastructure 
and public services for investment.  For example, using firm data on Uganda, Reinikka 
and Svensson (2002) find that the lack and inefficiency of public services constitute an 
important deterrent to investment.  They find that while firms find alternative private 
means of supplying for these services (e.g., private generators of electricity), this is 
accomplished at the cost of lower capital accumulation.  
 
Given that public investment appears to be a strong booster for private investment, the 
natural question then is how to finance public investment expansion and how the 
financing in turn will affect investment.  Government could raise revenue or resort to 
debt financing, which, according to South African government practice would involve 
                                                 
15 South Africa is right at the cut off point between upper middle income and lower middle-income 
countries.  Raising South Africa’s public investment to the average for lower middle income countries (7%) 
would result in a 11 percent increase in private investment. 
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primarily domestic borrowing.  According to the results in this study, domestic borrowing 
by government has a negative impact on investment.  However the results also suggest 
that the net impact of an increase in public investment financed by domestic borrowing is 
likely to be positive.  For example, if the increase in the public investment-GDP ratio 
from 5 percent to 6 percent described above was entirely financed by domestic debt, the 
crowding-out effect of the associated domestic borrowing would be a 1.7 percent decline 
in private investment and the net impact would be a 3.9 percent increase in private 
investment.16   
 
The actual net gain from expanding public investment may be lower than these estimates 
suggest due to other indirect effects of government borrowing, including higher interest 
rate.  We control for these effects in the regressions by adding the interest rate 
simultaneously with public investment.  High levels of debt may also have negative 
overhang effects on private investment.  Despite all these possible mitigating effects, the 
empirical evidence in this study supports the view that raising public investment 
constitutes a potent tool for boosting private investment.  The results cast doubt on claims 
that public investment may have crowded out private investment.  Instead, the results 
suggest that the government can stimulate an investment transition by raising its 
expenditure on infrastructure.  The results further suggest that the prolonged decline in 
public investment since the mid-1970s may have contributed to sluggish private 
investment. 
                                                 
16  Using the results in Table 5 where public investment and domestic borrowing are entered 
simultaneously, the net impact of a debt-financed increase in public investment is a 7.5 percent gain in 
private investment. This is not surprising since the extra domestic debt needed to finance the increase in 
public investment is an increase from a bigger base than the increase in public investment.   
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 Macroeconomic uncertainty: inflation and exchange rate variability 
The literature on investment in South Africa has emphasized macroeconomic and 
political uncertainty as an important deterrent to private investment (Fedderke 2004; 
Fielding 1997; Heintz 2000, 2002; Hirsh 2004).  The results in this study show that 
macroeconomic instability as measured by inflation and exchange rate variability has 
negative effects on private investment.   
 
The immediate policy implication of this result is that macroeconomic policy that aims at 
maintaining a stable value of the national currency while keeping inflation within 
reasonable range will help to promote private investment.  The key is to establish and 
maintain credibility through prudent macroeconomic policy.  In particular, monetary and 
exchange rate policy must be predictable by avoiding sudden changes in policy rules.  
However, the objective is not to achieve the lowest level of inflation.  Such a strategy 
would require maintaining high interest rates and large interest rate differentials, which as 
demonstrated in the regression results, would hurt private investment.  Moreover, 
targeting a very low inflation rate would result in an overvalued currency, which would 
discourage investment in export-oriented sectors and sectors that depend on imported 
inputs. 
 
The empirical results suggests that the benefits from the current relatively tight 
macroeconomic policy regime in terms of low inflation and policy credibility may be 
offset by negative effects of high interest rates on private investment.   The implication is 
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that while the government needs to continue pursuing prudent macroeconomic policy, 
there is a need to reevaluate the tightness of policy targets.  It is important to explore 
whether there is room for reducing the interest rate without running the risk of causing 
the inflation to rise out of control.  To the extent that the inflation target and outcomes 
remain in the single-digit range, and that macroeconomic policy continues to follow clear 
and consistent rules, there is good reason to believe that a cut in the interest rate would 
stimulate investment without undermining the success achieved during the post-apartheid 
era in the areas of stabilization and credibility of macroeconomic policy. 
 
Labor market factors 
The industry-level results show no significant effect of the unit cost of labor on 
investment.  However, the results for the manufacturing sector show a negative effect 
(though not robust to alternative specifications) of unit labor costs on investment, 
implying some complementarity between labor and capital.  However, as discussed 
above, a rise in wages discourages employment in the absence of offsetting labor 
productivity growth.  According to the data on the manufacturing sector in Table A3, the 
wage-labor productivity gap seems to be positively rather than negatively correlated with 
employment growth.  It appears that manufacturing subsectors where wages lagged 
behind labor productivity are also those which shed employment and vice versa.   
 
Overall, the results in this study are largely inconclusive vis-à-vis the linkages between 
labor market conditions and investment.  The results certainly do not support the view 
that labor costs are an important factor for labor shedding as a result of capital-labor 
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substitution.  However, the analysis is limited due to data scarcity which did not allow to 
incorporate the constraint of skills shortage.  This is a serious concern in the context of an 
economy that is experiencing simultaneously rapid technological advancement and high 
unskilled unemployment.  This topic merits serious attention. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This study aimed at documenting the role of determinants of private investment that are 
directly related to macroeconomic policy using both aggregate data at the industry level 
and disaggregated data at the sub-sector level in the manufacturing sector.  We highlight 
here four main conclusions from the econometric results which are especially relevant for 
policy.  First, a demand stimulus will have substantial effects on private investment.  This 
result implies that low domestic demand will continue to be a constraint to investment 
expansion.  Government policy can exploit this channel to stimulate investment through 
strategies that raise public as well as private domestic spending.  Second, the results 
suggest that relaxing the monetary policy stance will have some positive effects on 
private investment.  While the direct effects of interest rate cuts may be quantitatively 
small, it is still useful to exploit this policy route given that the government has direct 
measures to reduce the interest rate.  Moreover, indirect effects of lower interest rates 
operating notably through higher domestic demand and cheaper credit will amplify the 
direct effects in stimulating investment.   
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Third, the study finds that higher profitability stimulates investment.  One means at the 
government’s disposal for exploiting this result for stimulating investment is through 
public investment.  Higher investment in public infrastructure such as transport, 
telecommunication, and electricity will reduce private costs of production, thus raising 
profitability, which will stimulate private investment.  The results in this study establish a 
strong crowding-in effect of public investment on private investment.  Simple simulations 
from the regression results indicate that the crowding-in effects of public investment tend 
to dominate the crowding-out effects of domestic borrowing by the government.  Note 
that the government needs to explore other means for financing public investment that do 
not involve increasing domestic borrowing.  A public-investment led stimulus for private 
investment is a fiscally feasible strategy.   
 
Fourth, the results indicate that macroeconomic stability is essential for private 
investment.  In particular, price stability and exchange rate stability are important 
conditions for private investment expansion.  The results suggest that the gains from 
prudential macroeconomic policy are substantial.  Therefore, the need to stimulate private 
investment through relaxation of the macroeconomic stance ought to be balanced with the 
need to preserve macroeconomic stability.   
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Table 1: Determinants of private investment – Selected empirical evidence 
Factor Fedderke (2004) Fielding (1997) Mlambo and Nell (2000) Heintz (2000; 2002) 
Sample period, data, 
methodology 
1970-97; panel data; 27 
manufacturing sectors; panel 
data analysis 
1946-92; aggregate (distinguishing 
between traded and nontraded capital); 
Time series analysis 
1960-94; aggregate; Time 
series analysis 
1970-93; 7 industrial 
sectors; panel data analysis 
Demand; capacity; 
output 
 Proxy: change in real GDP at factor 
cost 
Result: positive effect 
Elasticity = +0.91 (nontraded); +1.07 
(traded) 
Proxy: change in real 
output 
Result: positive (small) 
effect 
Elasticity: 0.0001 
Proxy: sector value added 
Result: positive effect 
Elasticity: +0.014 
Macroeconomic 
uncertainty 
Proxy: expected change in 
output 
Result: positive effect (largest 
effect);  
Elasticity = +0.75 
   Variability of
macroeconomic 
environment 
Proxy: inflation; terms of 
trade, budget deficit; debt 
Results: all significant 
 
 
Political uncertainty Proxy: weighted average of 11 
indicators of repression 
Result: negative effect 
Elasticity = -0.06 
Proxy: number of strikes 
Result: negative effect on traded capital 
Elasticity: -0.09 (traded) 
   Proxy: combination of
prison population, 
detentions, strikes 
Result: negative effect (= 
factor effect) 
Elasticity: -0.027 
Rate of return (level and 
uncertainty of return) 
 Proxy: combination of variability of 
returns and cost of capital and industrial 
unrest 
Result: negative effect on nontraded 
capital; positive effect on traded capital 
Elasticity = -0.49 (nontraded); +0.35 
(traded) 
    Proxy: profit rate
Result: positive effect 
Elasticity: +0.027 
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Table 1 (Cont’d) 
 
Factor Fedderke (2004) Fielding (1997) Mlambo and Nell (2000) Heintz (2000; 2002) 
User cost; 
interest rate 
Proxy: real interest rate + depreciation 
rate + corporate tax rate 
Result: negative but insignificant 
Elasticity = 0 
Proxy: real interest rate 
Result: negative effect 
Elasticity = -1.36 
(nontraded); -1.14 
(traded) 
Proxy: real interest rate 
Result: negative effect 
Elasticity = 0.008 
Proxy: real interest rate + 
depreciation + tax rate 
Result: negative but 
insignificant 
Elasticity = 0 
Labor costs; 
wages 
Proxy: real wage 
Result: insignificant 
Elasticity = 0 
Proxy: aggregate real wage 
bill 
Result: positive (nontraded) 
Elasticity = +2.50 
Proxy: unit labor cost 
Result: negative effect 
Elasticity: -0.009 
 
Government 
investment 
Proxy: public investment 
Result: crowding-in 
Elasticity = 0.04 
Proxy: public investment 
Result: positive effect 
Elasticity = +0.44 
(nontraded); +0.36 
(traded) 
Proxy: public investment 
Result: positive effect 
Elasticity: +0.37 
Proxy: public investment 
Result: positive but 
insignificant 
Elasticity = 0 
Finance and 
credit 
Proxy: change in operating profits 
Result: insignificant 
Elasticity = 0 
Proxy: credit to the private 
sector 
Result: insignificant 
Elasticity = 0 
Proxy: domestic credit 
Result: positive effect 
Elasticity: +0.0003 
 
Trade 
liberalization;  
Exchange rate 
Proxy = (exports+imports)/value 
added 
Result: insignificant 
Elasticity = 0 
 Proxy: real exchange rate  
Result: negative effect 
Elasticity: -0.0001 
 
Fiscal policy  Proxy: (1 – effective tax on 
capital income = τ−1 ) 
Result: negative (nontraded 
capital) 
Elasticity = +2.28 
Proxy: budget deficit 
Result: negative effect of bond-
financed deficit (no effect of money-
financed deficit) 
Elasticity: -0.067 
 
Source: Fedderke, J.W., 2004. “Investment in fixed capital stock: Testing the impact of sectoral and systemic uncertainty.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 66 (2), 
165-187; Fielding, D., 1997. “Aggregate investment in South Africa: A model with implications for political freedom.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 59 
(3), 349-369; Heintz, James, 2000. “Political unrest, distributive conflict, and investment: the case of South Africa.” Paper presented at the PERI workshop on 
Investment in Africa, October 2000. Heintz, James, 2002. “Political conflict and the social structure of accumulation: The case of South African apartheid.” Review of 
Radical Political Economics, 34 (3), 319-326; Mlambo, K. and Kevin Nell, 2000. “Public policy and private investment in South Africa: An empirical investigation.” In 
Elbadawi, I. and T. Hartzenberg (Eds.). Development Issues in South Africa. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 80-109. 
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Table 2: Industry regression results – effects of monetary and fiscal policy factors 
(instrumental-variable two-way fixed effects estimates) 
 
 Real 
interest 
rate 
 
(1) 
Nominal 
interest 
rate 
 
(2) 
Short-term 
interest 
differential 
with U.S.  
(3) 
Public 
investment/GDP 
 
 
(4) 
Government 
domestic 
debt/GDP 
 
(5) 
Exchange 
rate 
variability 
 
(6) 
Lagged 
investment 
0.526 
(0.00) 
0.526 
(0.00) 
0.526 
(0.00)
0.526 
(0.00) 
0.526 
(0.00) 
0.526 
(0.00)
Output 
growth 
0.039 
(0.06) 
0.039 
(0.06) 
0.039 
(0.06)
0.039 
(0.06) 
0.039 
(0.06) 
0.039 
(0.00)
Lagged 
output 
growth 
0.046 
(0.02) 
0.046 
(0.02) 
0.046 
(0.02)
0.046 
(0.02) 
0.046 
(0.02) 
0.046 
(0.00)
Profit 0.0003 
(0.01) 
0.0003 
(0.01) 
0.0003 
(0.01)
0.0003 
(0.01) 
0.0003 
(0.01) 
0.0003 
(0.01)
Real unit 
labor costs 
(change) 
0.015 
(0.64) 
0.016 
(0.64) 
0.015 
(0.64)
0.015 
(0.64) 
0.015 
(0.64) 
0.015 
(0.64)
Corporate 
tax rate 
(change) 
-0.100 
(0.00) 
-0.425 
(0.00) 
-0.021 
(0.80)
-0.049 
(0.69) 
-0.370 
(0.00) 
0.058 
(0.56)
Real interest 
rate 
-0.170 
(0.00) 
  
Nominal 
interest rate 
 -0.175 
(0.00) 
-0.056 
(0.25) 
-0.203 
(0.04) 
Inflation  -0.262 
(0.00) 
-0.157 
(0.00) 
-0.307 
(0.00) 
Interest rate 
differential 
  -0.203 
(0.00)
 
Public 
investment 
  0.415 
(0.01) 
 
Government 
domestic 
debt 
  -0.099 
(0.04) 
 
Exchange 
rate 
variability 
   -0.198 
(0.00)
R-sq within 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
R-sq 
between 
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99
R-sq overall 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
F-test for 
fixed effects 
7.05 
(0.00) 
7.05 
(0.00) 
7.05 
(0.00)
7.05 
(0.00) 
7.05 
(0.00) 
7.05
- Sample: 9 industries, 1972-2001, N=256 observations. 
- The dependent variable is gross investment as a percentage of capital stock. The 
numbers in parentheses are the p-values. 
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Table 3: Manufacturing sector results – monetary and fiscal policy factors 
(GMM two-step results) 
 
 Cost of 
capital 
 
 
(1) 
Real 
interest 
rate 
 
(2) 
Policy 
components 
of cost of 
capital 
(3) 
Public 
investment
 
 
(4) 
Government 
domestic 
debt/GDP 
 
(5) 
Exchange 
rate 
variability
 
(6) 
Lagged 
investment 
.547 
(0.00) 
0.577 
(0.00) 
.608 
(0.00) 
.633
(0.00)
.561 
(0.00) 
0.513
(0.00)
Output growth  .034 
(0.00) 
0.030 
(0.01) 
.025 
(0.01) 
.033
(0.00)
.037 
(0.00) 
0.043
(0.00)
Lagged output 
growth 
.033 
(0.00) 
0.016 
(0.04) 
.029 
(0.00) 
.033
(0.00)
.047 
(0.00) 
0.041
(0.00)
Real unit labor 
costs 
-.052 
(0.00) 
-0.039 
(0.09) 
-.036 
(0.12) 
-.018
(0.43)
-.034 
(0.18) 
-0.033
(0.06)
Cost of capital -0.048 
(0.07) 
     
Real interest 
rate 
 -0.190 
(0.03) 
    
Nominal 
lending rate 
  -.186 
(0.08) 
-.274 
(0.02) 
-.139 
(0.26) 
Inflation   -.273 
(0.02) 
-.159 
(0.28) 
-.324 
(0.03) 
Corporate tax 
rate (change) 
 -0.046 
(0.66) 
-.215 
(0.03) 
-.283 
(0.00) 
-.324 
(0.01) 
Public 
investment 
   .886
(0.02)
  
Government 
domestic debt 
    -.229 
(0.04) 
Exchange rate 
variability 
     -0.065
(0.00)
     
First-order 
autocorrelation 
-3.30 
(0.001) 
-3.13 
(0.00) 
-3.40 
(0.00) 
-3.44
(0.00)
-3.29 
(0.00) 
-3.20
(0.00)
Second-order 
autocorrelation 
-1.27 
(0.20) 
-1.23 
(0.22) 
-1.19 
(0.23) 
-1.13
(0.25)
-1.21 
(0.23) 
-1.34
(0.18)
Sample: 27 sub-sectors of the manufacturing sector; N=756 
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Table 4: Estimated elasticities 
 
variable 9 major industries 27 manufacturing subsector 
 Table 
(eq.) 
coefficient elasticity Table 
(eq.) 
coefficient elasticity 
Output(sum) 2 (1) 0.085 0.019 3 (3) 0.054 0.01 
User cost of 
capital 
Nr 0 0 3 (1) -0.048 -0.085 
Profit 2 (1) 0.0003 0.02 na na na 
Unit labor costs 
(growth rate) 
2 (1) 0 0 3 (1) -0.052 -0.35 
Real interest 
rate 
2 (1) -0.17 -0.067 3 (2) -0.19 -0.049 
Nominal 
interest rate 
2 (2) -0.175 -0.264 3 (3) -0.186 -0.178 
Inflation 2 (2) -0.262 -0.293 3 (3) -0.273 -0.19 
Corporate tax 
rate (change) 
2 (1-5) 0 to -
0.425 
0 to -
0.003 
3 (2-55) 0 to -
0.324 
0 to -
0.001 
Short-term 
interest rate 
differential 
2 (3) -0.203 -0.015  0 0 
Exchange rate 
variability 
3 (6) -0.198 -0.182 3 (6) -0.065 -0.044 
Public 
investment/GDP 
2 (4) 0.415 0.282 3 (4) 0.886 0.387 
Government 
borrowing 
2 (5) -0.099 -0.350 3 (5) -0.229 -0.552 
 
Note: a value of 0 means that the partial effect or the elasticity is not statistically 
significant at the 10% level.   
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Table 5: Manufacturing sector – investment regressions with capacity 
underutilization, 1986-2001. (GMM two-step regressions) 
 
 I (with real 
interest 
rate) 
II (with 
nominal 
interest rate) 
III (with public 
investment) 
IV (public 
investment and 
debt) 
Lag investment 0.498
(0.00)
0.399
(0.00)
0.488 
(0.00) 
0.455
(0.00)
Output growth 0.004
(0.02)
0.005
(0.00)
0.002 
(0.00) 
0.0003
(0.77)
Lag output growth  0.003
(0.06)
Capacity 
underutilization 
-0.200
(0.00)
-0.240
(0.00)
-0.236 
(0.00) 
-0.285
(0.00)
Corporate tax -0.251
(0.00)
-0.216
(0.01)
 
Real interest rate -0.024
(0.00)
-0.022 
(0.00) 
Nominal interest 
rate 
-0.306
(0.00)
 
Inflation -0.051
(0.00)
 
Public investment 0.203 
(0.02) 
0.508
(0.00)
Domestic debt  -0.818
(0.00)
First-order 
autocorrelation 
-3.63
(0.00)
-3.27
(0.00)
-3.65 
(0.00) 
-3.82
(0.00)
Second-order 
autocorrelation 
-0.61
(0.54)
-0.86
(0.39)
-0.87 
(0.38) 
-0.95
(0.34)
Number of observations = 341 (except in column IV where N=366). 
Note: All variables are in logarithm except for output growth, the real interest rate, and 
inflation.  For variables in logs, the coefficients are the associated elasticities of 
investment.  The real interest rate elasticity of investment can be computed by 
multiplying the coefficient on the real interest rate and the average real interest rate over 
the regression period (=6.74), which yields -0.16 and -0.17 in equations I and III, 
respectively. 
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Table A1: Monetary policy regimes in South Africa, 1960-todate 
 
Period Monetary regime Main features of monetary policy and context 
1960-1980 Liquid asset/Deposits ratio-based 
system with  
quantitative controls over  
interest rates and credit 
- Main focus is on liquid assets/deposits requirements.  Rationale: limited supply of and yields  
on liquid assets contain bank lending and thus money supply; minor role of the interest rate. 
- Starting from 1973, the SARB begins setting accommodation rates above money market rates,  
which raises interest rates; Direct limits on bank credit cause disintermediation 
1981-1985 Mixed system during transition - Gradual change from liquid assets/deposits ratio-based system to cost of reserves system  
(in effect in Mid-1985) 
 Gradual removal of credit ceilings 
- Reforms recommended by the De Kock Commission. 
- 1979-80 oil price hikes, low interest rates, and high money growth contribute to “overheated economy”. 
1986 to  
February 1998 
Cost of cash reserves-based  
system with pre-announced  
monetary targets (M3) 
- Reforms following recommendations by the De Kock Commission; Also new Bank Governor  
(Dr. Chris Stals) more “conservative” (in the sense of inflation aversion) 
- The Reserve Bank announces annually the targeted growth rate for M3, from 1986 to 1998. 
- Targets are to be achieved by changing the interest rate; short term rate is the main monetary  
policy instrument 
- The ‘Bank rate’ is used to control demand for bank credit; indirect monetary policy control through  
the control of money demand. 
March 1998 to  
January 2000 
Repo system: daily tenders  
of liquidity through  
repurchase transactions +  
pre-announced M3 targets  
+ informal targets of core  
inflation (1-5% range) 
- Breakdown of the money growth,-output growth relationship, partly due to financial liberalization  
and various structural changes; Result: consistent overshooting of the M3 growth target  
(target hit only 5 out of 15 years from 1986 to 2000). 
- March 1998: a new system of monetary accommodation is announced (the repurchase system) 
- Objective of rationing the amount of liquidity in the financial system. 
- The Reserve Bank announced its desire to reduce inflation to levels prevailing among major trading partners 
- Informal targeting of overall inflation rate in the 1-5% range 
- Greater transparency and credibility become part of the main objectives of the monetary policy orientation 
February 2000  
– to date 
Explicit inflation targeting  
with a range of 3-6% for the 
 CPIX 
- February 2000: The Reserve Bank declares inflation targeting as the primary focus of monetary policy. 
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Table A2: Summary statistics (9 industries; 27 manufacturing sub-sectors) (1972-
2001) 
 
 9 industries 27 manufacturing sub-
sectors 
 obs mean std. 
dev. 
obs mean std. dev. 
Investment/capital stock (%) 270 10.55 5.06 810 16.31 10.59
Real gdp growth (%) 270 2.41 6.21 810 2.48 11.92
Cost of capital 270 16.36 8.05 810 23.62 8.11
Real labor cost (growth rate, %) 265 4.25 4.35 810 4.58 7.93
Employment growth (%) 265 0.05 4.87 810 0.34 6.27
Wage-productivity gap (growth differential, 
%) 1972-2001 
265 0.16 6.97 810 0.08 11.41
Wage-productivity gap (growth differential, 
%) 1986-2001 
139 -0.56 6.19 405 -1.46 11.20
Aggregate indicators 
Lending rate (%) 15.61 4.20
Real lending rate (%) 4.21 5.34
Inflation (%) 11.41 3.58
Corporate tax (%) 13.94 3.14
Real short-term interest differential (%) -0.67 4.94
Real long-term interest differential (%) -1.14 3.97
Real exchange rate variability (%) 11.12 8.20
Public investment/GDP (%) 7.19 2.54
Government domestic borrowing/GDP (%) 37.22 6.29
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Table A3: Summary statistics - manufacturing sub-sector (averages 1986-2001) 
 
Sub-sector Investment  
/capital 
 stock 
ratio 
 (%) 
Output 
growth 
(%) 
Total 
capacity 
under-
utilization 
 (%) 
underutilization 
due to 
insufficient 
 demand (%) 
Wage –  
productivity 
gap (%)* 
Employment 
growth 
(%) 
Basic chemicals 11.1 2.0 17.3 65.5 -2.2 -0.4 
Beverages 14.6 2.0 25.4 64.7 -0.4 -2.0 
Basic iron 
metals 
10.7 3.1 13.5 73.2 -5.7 -5.0 
Electrical 
machinery 
12.7 0.0 23.1 73.2 0.5 1.2 
Fabricated metal 17.3 0.1 22.6 74.8 -1.2 -1.6 
Food products 12.8 1.0 20.0 55.5 -0.3 -1.2 
Furniture 16.9 2.5 20.6 72.4 -0.4 1.1 
Foot wear 12.7 -1.5 14.9 75.3 -3.7 -5.4 
Scientific 
instruments 
17.7 2.0 17.8 78.1 -0.6 -0.9 
Leather 19.8 0.6 14.7 58.8 -1.9 -0.6 
Machinery 12.2 -1.1 25.0 75.4 -3.2 -1.6 
Glass  13.0 1.6 12.3 72.1 0.4 -1.6 
Motor vehicle & 
parts 
18.3 3.4 25.4 64.6 -4.5 -0.4 
Non-ferrous 
metals 
20.1 8.2 10.8 57.5 -8.9 -4.0 
Other chemicals 9.1 1.2 22.0 73.4 -0.6 -0.9 
Tobacco 
products 
15.3 -3.1 16.9 65.2 -0.6 -0.9 
Non-metal 
minerals 
7.8 0.1 22.7 82.5 -1.5 -4.4 
Paper & paper 
products 
17.4 2.4 12.2 66.6 0.7 0.1 
Coke and 
petroleum 
products 
6.5 -1.2 12.5 68.5 -0.6 -0.9 
Plastic products 23.4 5.9 22.1 78.1 0.7 3.9 
Printing & 
publishing 
17.1 1.8 16.6 76.5 2.7 1.9 
Television, radio 
equipment 
18.6 3.6 24.4 87.8 -0.6 -0.9 
Rubber products 15.2 0.6 18.5 62.3 -4.4 -2.2 
Other transport 
equipment 
8.8 -3.0 30.1 82.8 -2.5 -3.1 
Textile products 16.0 -1.6 19.3 69.4 -2.3 -3.6 
Apparel  17.3 1.1 13.3 62.3 0.0 -0.3 
Wood products 11.8 1.2 14.3 63.6 1.4 1.9 
Source: author’s computation from TIPS and SARB data. 
* wage-productivity gap = growth rate of real wages – growth rate of labor productivity. 
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Figure 1: Total investment (% of GDP)
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Figure 2: Gross capital formation, public and private (% of GDP)
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Figure 3: Public investment: South Africa vs. other developing countries
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 Figure 4: Short term real interest rate differential between South Africa and 
the USA and the UK
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Figure 5: Government expenditure, revenue, and debt (% of GDP)
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